It has become widely recognised that the plight of the British
INTRODUCTION
The exten t of the inepti tude which charac tel' I sed the conduc t of the Crimean War (1854-1856) by the British was such that it "has become a byword for disaster, gross mismanagement and incompetent leadership"l which, according to Barnett 2 has made it "one of the compulsive subjects of British historical writing".
I twas, wro te National indifference towards the state of the army and be traced to these sources but more especially to the traditional "National transcended Sir Edward
Coffin, urged General
The ca Iae I ty of the Cr illea was so monstrous and so avoidable military manifest themselves in a preference for cheeseparing individuals, departments and Government. 8 Equally tragic, and yet not unusual in the context of the Crimean War, was the plight of the Medical Officer of the hospital ship Charity. On the ship he had a large nuaber-of cholera cases, whose suffering was aggravated by the absence of warm surroundings.
To improve conditions the Medical Officer sought to acquire some stoves from the Commissariat. Despite the obvious urgency of the situation the Medical Officer was properly informed:
Comolissary:
Medical Officer:
Co.missary:
You must make your requisition in due form, send it to headquarters, and get it signed properly, and returned, and then I will let you have the stoves.
But my men may die meantime.
I can't help that; I must have the requisiton.
It is .y firm belief that there are men now in a dangerous state whom another night will certainly kill. Early supply Dlanuals, and subsequent manuals, displayed a disproportionate concern for bookwork and correspondence in coaparLson to the attention given to the mechanics of supply. "Yet that in itself", admits Glover when reflecting upon the 1796 supply manual of Havilland Le Mesurier, "was the natural result of a system under which the Commissal'y was so much more directly responsible to a Treasury which insisted on accurate accounting than to a Commander-in-Chief who merely wanted his men and horses to be properly fed".29
As the military's banker and the Treasury's, and therefore Parliament's, representative in the field it was above everything else the duty of the Commissariat to call to the attention of the officer commanding every instance in which a payment aay be authorised, at variance with established regulations, or with any particular direction of the Treasury Board, as well as to report on the subject to the Treasury. 30 Despite the plight of the army in the Crimea, any change In the professional behaviour of the Commissariat, unfortunately, was remo te . To change the habi t s of a Ii f e time in the service of the Treasury was easier said than accomplished. For the CO"lllissariat Officer "to suddenly cast behind every tradition of his department, every habit to which he had been carefully trained and, in the midst of new and arduous tasks, construct for himself a new theory of duty and a new set of regulations" was out of the question. 3] .
Comnlissariat officers generally had no choice but to follow the given financial instructions that were "suitable for a time of peace, but inapplicable to a period of war, and operating unjustly on soldiers".32
Members of the Commissariat were only too aware of the eagerness and relish with which the army notoriously sought to blame 7. regulations could have been readily and threatingly interpreted as denying the wishes and directions of the off ice from which they emanated. and 'unclassified' system of accounts he was instrumental in introducing in the Commissariat, when it was under the direcL control of the Treasury, not only answered every purpose, but was far bet tel' for purposes of check than any more complex system that could be adopted ... and attained the objects of a military system of accounts. 51
Despite previous improvements to, and simplificallon of, ar'my accounts. but largely because of the uncerLainLles and urgency of a major campaign, much to its horror the Royal Commission discovered that the accounts constructed in the field were generally 80
inaccurate "that but little reliance could be placed upon the officer was made accountable for all Lteas that entered his slore.
Once they left his store they were no longer his concern and so he eliminated them from his books, This practice led to the curious "habit of wri ling off as issues, nume rcus supplies whi ch had not been distributed to the troops, but which had been merely transferred from the store at Balaclava to the control of the navy in store ships in the harbour". 53 The stores then, for all intents and purposes, ceased to exist l>ecause they did not appear in the appeared to use no commonsense or In I tiative in the records they made. Their one concern, which overrode any considerations of providing a service suited to the requirements of the situation, was to ensure they had sufficient documentation or proof to cover thease lves given, argued the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the The great personal responsibility of each supply officer, discharged through his accounts, induced a state of mind noL unlike tha t required La participate in a game of 'pass the hoL potato'.
The Coaa.l s sat-Lat. Off icer was trained to regard himself and his existence of those engaged in battle was considered after Treasury
We were not supposed Lo have any knowledge of them, bUL merely the care of keeping and accounting form them".57
The seeming paradox presented by con t esrpor-ar i es at the front of a very hard working but ineffective Commissariat call be explained to a very large extent in terms of meLiculous attention to the 
